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THE ROLE OF DEFERENCE IN JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF PUBLIC USE DETERMINATIONS 
Lynda J. Oswald* 
Abstract: In Kelo v. City of New London, the United States Supreme Court 
emphasized its longstanding practice of deferring to legislative determi-
nations of public use. However, the Court also explicitly acknowledged 
that the U.S. Constitution sets a floor, not a ceiling, on individual rights 
and that the state courts are entitled to take a less deferential approach 
under their own state constitutions or statutes. This manuscript examines: 
(1) the ways in which the role of deference in judicial review of public use 
determinations can vary between federal and state courts and among 
state jurisdictions; and (2) the difficult issues raised by the interplay be-
tween legislatures and courts in public use determinations. Because the 
Supreme Court’s deferential approach to public use disputes provides lit-
tle succor to property owners challenging takings, state court challenges 
to takings are likely to become increasingly important. Property owners, 
therefore, need to understand the issues raised by deference in judicial 
review of public use challenges in both federal and state courts. 
Introduction 
 Recent developments in takings jurisprudence highlight important 
but unsettled questions in eminent domain law. To what degree is de-
termination of public use a judicial, rather than legislative, question? 
How much deference do courts owe legislatures in takings determina-
tions? Are different types of legislative determinations afforded differ-
ent degrees of deference? And how do the answers to such questions 
change if the taking is challenged in a state court, under a state consti-
tutional or statutory provision, rather than in federal court under the 
U.S. Constitution? Although these questions are not new to eminent 
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domain law and theory, they were brought to the fore by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London.1 
 The Court’s fractured 5–4 decision in Kelo has opened a Pandora’s 
Box of difficult doctrinal and theoretical questions.2 The uncertainties 
posed by Kelo are evident in the extensive legal commentary on the 
Court’s adoption of an expansive definition of “public use” as being 
coterminous with “public purpose” and the thorny issue of determin-
ing pretext in condemnations.3 Less attention has been focused upon 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005). The facts of Kelo v. City of New London are straightfor-
ward. Connecticut identified the city of New London as a “distressed municipality” in 1990, 
with an unemployment rate nearly twice that of the rest of the state. Id. at 473. In an effort 
to revitalize, the city authorized the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a 
private nonprofit entity, to assist the city in its economic redevelopment efforts. Id. Ulti-
mately, the NLDC came up with an ambitious plan for a mixed-use development in a wa-
terfront location. Id. at 473–75. The NLDC was able to purchase most of the property that 
it identified as necessary to implement its plan, but nine property owners, including 
Susette Kelo, refused to sell. Id. at 475. The NLDC started condemnation proceedings. Id. 
The property owners responded by filing suit to enjoin the takings in state court. Id. The 
trial court issued a permanent injunction restraining the taking of certain parcels, but 
allowing the taking of others. Id. at 475–76. Both sides appealed. Id. at 476. The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court determined that all of the takings were permissible. Id. Ms. Kelo and 
the other property owners appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. at 477. The Su-
preme Court upheld the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision. Id. at 470, 490. 
2 See id. at 470; see, e.g., Robert H. Thomas, Recent Developments in Public Use and Pretext 
in Eminent Domain, 41 Urb. Law. 563, 565 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court’s 
“amorphous standards” left “issues for another day”). Two aspects of Kelo in particular were 
hailed as path-breaking holdings. See Thomas, supra, at 563–64. First, the Kelo Court stated 
that under the U.S. Constitution economic development can be a valid public use for pur-
poses of eminent domain law, even if the property taken will ultimately be owned by an-
other private party and not the public. 545 U.S. at 484–86. Second, the Court established 
that takings in which the stated public use or purpose was a “pretext” intended to bestow 
“a private benefit” are unconstitutional, but provided no criteria for identifying pretext in 
this setting. See id. at 478. 
3 See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and 
Impermissible Favoritism, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 173, 174, 184–85 (2009); Thomas, supra 
note 2, at 563–65; Daniel S. Hafetz, Note, Ferreting Out Favoritism: Bringing Pretext Claims 
After Kelo, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 3095, 3098–3100 (2009). Different courts take varying 
approaches in determining whether a taking is pretextual. Kelly, supra, at 184–85. Some 
courts focus on the predicted amount of public benefits, others on the presence of com-
prehensive development plans, and still others on the identifiability of the condemnation’s 
private beneficiaries. Id. “Pretext” in takings was not a new concept raised by Kelo. See Gold-
stein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 61–62 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Prior to Kelo, no Supreme Court deci-
sion had endorsed the notion of a ‘pretext’ claim, although a few lower court cases con-
tained language suggesting that pretextual public use may be invalid.”). For a discussion of 
the historical background of pretext challenges to takings, see Carol L. Zeiner, When Kelo 
Met Twombly-Iqbal: Implications for Pretext Challenges to Eminent Domain, 46 Willamette L. 
Rev. 201, 234–37 (2009). See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister 
Schemes, Improper Motives, and Bad Faith in Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
2012] Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use Determinations 245 
the predicate question, however, of how to balance the traditional def-
erence courts give to legislative determinations of public use with the 
constitutional guarantees given to private property owners.4 Under 
what circumstances should the courts moderate their traditionally def-
erential stance to inquire into the motives of legislatures? How do we 
balance the traditional deference given by courts to legislative determi-
nations of the need to take property by eminent domain (a deference 
drawn from traditional separation of powers and institutional compe-
tency notions) with the Kelo Court’s holding that pretextual takings are 
unconstitutional? 
 The Kelo Court reaffirmed the highly deferential review that fed-
eral courts afford legislative determinations,5 ensuring that most tak-
ings will continue to receive, at best, a cursory review if challenged in 
federal court.6 The Court also explicitly acknowledged that state courts 
might take a less deferential approach under their own state constitu-
tions or statutes.7 Thus, at the same time the Supreme Court slammed 
the federal courtroom door on property owners challenging takings, it 
pointed out that the state courtroom doors remain ajar.8 As a result, 
state statutory and constitutional provisions are likely to take on an in-
creasingly larger role in the protection of private property rights.9 
 Part I provides a brief overview of the evolution of the Supreme 
Court’s deferential review of legislative determinations of public use, 
and discusses the precedent that led to the culmination of the Supreme 
Court’s hands-off approach in Kelo. Part II addresses the manner in 
which the state courts’ roles in judicial review of public use determina-
tions are expanding even as the federal courts’ role is contracting. Part 
III first examines the growing schism between the views of federal and 
some state courts on the proper role of courts in reviewing such deter-
minations. Then, it examines the various ways in which public use 
analysis can vary among state jurisdictions and the thorny issues raised 
                                                                                                                      
45 (2008) (arguing that a lack of transparency in eminent domain actions subverts the 
political process and may render the taking void). 
4 See infra notes 153–177 and accompanying text. 
5 545 U.S. at 480; see infra notes 59–64 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
treatment of deference). 
6 See 545 U.S. at 483 (avoiding “intrusive scrutiny” and allowing legislatures “broad lati-
tude” in public use determinations). 
7 Id. at 489 (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from plac-
ing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”). 
8 See id. at 489–90. 
9 See id. (discussing the federal judiciary’s willingness to step in only to consider 
whether takings constitute a constitutional “public use” and noting that state constitutions 
and statutes may allow for stricter standards of review). 
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by the interplay between legislatures and courts in takings analyses. For 
example, should public use be viewed as a judicial or legislative ques-
tion? How does deference relate to the separation of powers doctrine? 
Unfortunately, rather than providing the clarity for which commenta-
tors and lower courts had hoped, Kelo merely opened the door to such 
inquiries.10 One thing is clear post-Kelo—although the primary battle-
ground for protection of private property rights in recent years has 
been the federal courts, the pendulum is swinging back toward a 
greater role for state courts in takings cases.11 
I. The Contracting Role of the Federal Courts in  
Public Use Disputes 
 In theory, there is a (somewhat) tidy divide between the roles of 
legislatures and courts in eminent domain cases.12 Questions of the 
necessity for the taking (i.e., whether a particular public improvement 
should be undertaken, where it should be sited, and whether the emi-
nent domain power should be used to acquire the property on which 
the improvement will be located) are issues generally left to the legisla-
ture.13 Questions of whether a particular use is a public use are gener-
ally, although not always,14 for the judiciary.15 
 In practice, courts—particularly federal courts—have increasingly 
abdicated control over public use determinations to the legislature.16 
This Part discusses the jurisprudential developments that led to the 
federal courts’ extremely deferential approach to public use challenges 
in eminent domain cases and concomitant shrinking of judicial review 
in federal takings cases. 
                                                                                                                      
10 See infra notes 178–254 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 153–177 and accompanying text. 
12 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488–89 (acknowledging the limit of the Court’s authority when 
deciding eminent domain cases); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1892) 
(limiting the role of the courts in eminent domain cases to determining only whether the 
use is in fact a public use). 
13 See Robert C. Bird & Lynda J. Oswald, Necessity As a Check on State Eminent Domain 
Power, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 99, 107–09 (2009); Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private 
Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 409, 424 (1983) (“In the 
hornbook scheme, the legislature prescribes conditions under which eminent domain may 
be exercised and decides the necessity of acquiring any particular parcel, while the courts 
decide whether the public use clause has been satisfied.”). 
14 See Bird & Oswald, supra note 13, at 116–18. 
15 See Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at 298. 
16 See Bird & Oswald, supra note 13, at 114–15, 114 n.65. 
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A. The Takings Clause Baselines: Necessity v. Public Use 
 The fundamental underpinnings of the eminent domain power 
are the same at both the state and federal levels—state and federal legal 
systems each recognize the eminent domain power as an inherent and 
essential attribute of sovereignty.17 Actual governmental exercise of that 
power, however, can be very different in those two arenas.18 
 At the federal level, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
limits the federal government’s ability to exercise its sovereign power of 
eminent domain by prohibiting the taking of private property except 
for a public use and only upon payment of just compensation.19
 
Both 
requirements must be met.20 If the taking fails to satisfy the public use 
requirement, or is so arbitrary as to be a violation of due process, the 
exercise of eminent domain is unconstitutional and “[n]o amount of 
compensation can authorize” the taking.21 
 Initially, the Constitution’s constraint upon the use of eminent do-
main reached only the federal government, not the state governments 
or their political subdivisions.22 In 1896, however, the Supreme Court 
extended the reach of the Constitution’s protections, limiting takings by 
states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
Thus, property owners can challenge state, as well as federal, takings 
under the U.S. Constitution.24 
 Most state constitutions contain takings clauses with public use and 
just compensation requirements similar to those in the Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution.25 States, however, have the ability to im-
                                                                                                                      
17 See Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) (“The taking of private 
property for public use upon just compensation is so often necessary for the proper per-
formance of governmental functions that the power is deemed to be essential to the life of 
the State.”); Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 723 (1836) (“The power 
of appropriating private property to public purposes is an incident of sovereignty.”). The 
Supreme Court has also stated that the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is a 
“tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private property for public use, rather 
than a grant of new power.” United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946); see also 
Oswald, supra note 3, at 52–53. 
18 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (describing differences between federal and state require-
ments for public use). 
19 See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
20 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005). 
21 Id. at 543. 
22 See id. at 536. 
23 See Chi., B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
24 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472 & n.1. 
25 See 2A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 7.01[1] & n.10, at 7-18 
(3d ed. 2011) (listing state statutory and constitutional provisions). 
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pose more stringent limitations upon their own power to take through 
either more restrictive state constitutional provisions or state statutes.26 
Many have chosen to do so.27 Thus, takings initiated by state actors can 
be challenged in state courts under state constitutional or statutory 
provisions, or in the federal courts under the U.S. Constitution.28 
 This plethora of causes of action does not necessarily translate to 
heightened protection for private property rights.29 At the federal level, 
courts apply a rational basis standard of review to governmental deci-
sions to take property—a standard that upholds legislative taking deci-
sions in most situations.30 As summarized by the Supreme Court in 
1984: “[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally 
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a 
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”31 The 
Kelo majority reaffirmed this deferential standard of review,32 making it 
clear that the federal courts defer both to legislative and state court de-
terminations of public use.33 
 Deference arises in two distinct contexts in eminent domain cases: 
(1) determinations of public use; and (2) determinations of necessity.34 
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. § 7.10[1]. 
27 Id. 
28 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90 (noting that federal review of state action is limited to 
ensuring compliance with the Fifth Amendment, while state power can be restricted by a 
state’s statutes or constitution). 
29 See Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent Domain’s “Summer of Scrutiny,” 59 
Ala. L. Rev. 561, 576 (2008) (showing that federal court review of public use has been 
narrowed). 
30 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion of the federal 
standard see infra notes 54–56, 85–100 and accompanying text. 
31 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
32 See 545 U.S. at 488 (“‘When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are 
not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings . . . 
are not to be carried out in the federal courts.’”) (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43). 
33 See id. at 482 (highlighting “the ‘great respect’ that [federal courts] owe to state leg-
islatures and state courts in discerning local public needs”) (citing Hairston v. Danville & 
W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606–07 (1908)). In Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, the Su-
preme Court advanced a deferential position to state court judgments in determining 
whether a use was public or private, since the question was judicial in nature. See 262 U.S. 
700, 705–06 (1923). The Court noted that “the determination of this question is influ-
enced by local conditions; and this Court, while enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, should keep in view the diversity of such conditions.” Id. Some pre-
Kelo decisions did note that the federal courts were not completely abdicating their role of 
judicial review, but such indications were rare. See, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster 
Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that “even under such 
a deferential standard, however, public use is not established as a matter of law whenever 
the legislative body acts”), dismissed, 60 F. App’x 123 (9th Cir. 2003). 
34 See Bird & Oswald, supra note 13, at 115; Oswald, supra note 3, at 56. 
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The Supreme Court addressed judicial deference in public use cases in 
Shoemaker v. United States.35 There, the Court found that the judiciary 
may review a legislative decision to take private property in order to 
determine whether the use is public.36 If the court identifies a public 
use, its inquiry ceases, and the legislature may determine “the extent to 
which such property shall be taken for such use” so long as there is just 
compensation.37 Theoretically, necessity is a separate inquiry from pub-
lic use,38 and addresses factors that are largely factual in nature and of a 
type more commonly left to legislative decision making.39 The distinc-
tion between public use and necessity is not razor-sharp, however, and 
the terms have a tendency to merge, making analyses unclear and the 
scope of the judicial role and the level of deference due uncertain.40 
All of this adds to the general confusion that permeates this area of 
eminent domain law.41 
                                                                                                                     
 Under the necessity doctrine, the condemning authority must jus-
tify an intended taking as necessary to further a proposed public use.42 
For a host of pragmatic and theoretical reasons, including judicial re-
spect for the independent roles of legislatures and courts, and separa-
tion of powers notions,43 the courts have long established that issues of 
necessity lie within the purview of the legislature.44 Courts typically in-
tervene in necessity determinations only where there are clear abuses 
 
35 See 147 U.S. at 298. 
36 See id. 
37 See id.; United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 685 (1896) (establish-
ing that public use may be a judicial question but the quantity of land to be taken is a legis-
lative question). 
38 See 1 John Lewis, Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United 
States § 255, at 502–03 (3d ed. 1909) [hereinafter 1 Lewis] (“Nearly all the cases . . . hold 
that the question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and that the for-
mer question is exclusively for the legislature.”). 
39 See Bird & Oswald, supra note 13, at 108. 
40 See id. at 116–18. 
41 See id. at 113–18 (describing the overlap between necessity and public use, and the 
general confusion this causes). 
42 Id. at 99. Necessity implicates three distinct questions, each of which is narrowly 
drawn to the specific facts of the proposed taking at issue: (1) whether the legislature 
should pursue a particular public improvement; (2) where that improvement should be 
located; and (3) whether the eminent domain power (as opposed to the police power, a 
voluntary purchase, or other acquisition mechanism) should be used to obtain the prop-
erty interests needed for the improvement. See id. at 108. 
43 See id. at 112–13. 
44 See id. at 109–10. 
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of discretion by the legislature or where a statute specifically assigns the 
court a role in these determinations.45 
 State courts also traditionally have drawn a distinction between 
whether a use is public, which they deem a judicial question, and 
whether the power of eminent domain should be exercised, or its ne-
cessity, which they deem a legislative question.46 As the New York Court 
of Appeals explained in an 1894 case: “The legislature must be pre-
sumed to be the best judge of the necessity of public works and im-
provements; of how they shall be instituted and of how they should be 
carried on so as to best subserve public ends.”47 But, as the court went 
on to caution, “whether the use for which the property is to be taken is 
a public use, which justifies its appropriation, is a judicial question 
upon which the courts are free to decide.”48 
 More recently, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island explicitly drew 
the traditional distinction between necessity and public use, stating that 
the “necessity and expediency” of a specific taking is a legislative ques-
tion outside the purview of the court.49 Legislative declarations of pub-
lic use, by contrast, although “instructive and entitled to deference,” 
are nonetheless subject to judicial review.50 
 Therefore, in theory, both state and federal courts have an impor-
tant role to play in reviewing public use determinations.51 The Supreme 
Court, however, has constricted the federal courts’ role in judicial review 
                                                                                                                      
45 See Bird & Oswald, supra note 13, at 118; 2 John Lewis, Treatise on the Law of 
Eminent Domain in the United States § 601, at 1063 (3d ed. 1909). 
46 See Christopher G. Tiedeman, A Treatise on the Limitations of the Police 
Power in the United States Considered from Both a Civil and a Criminal Stand-
point 378 (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2001) (1886). 
47 In re City of Brooklyn, 38 N.E. 983, 989 (N.Y. 1894), aff’d sub nom. Long Island Water-
Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897). Early commentators also agreed with 
this view. See, e.g., 1 Lewis, supra note 38, § 252, at 499 (“[P]rivate property can be taken 
only for public use, and . . . what is a public use is a question for the courts.”); Tiedeman, 
supra note 46, at 378 (“It is a legislative question whether the public exigencies require the 
appropriation, but it is clearly a judicial question, whether a particular confiscation of land 
has been made for a public purpose.”). Furthermore, a commentator noted that “[t]he 
question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and . . . the former ques-
tion is exclusively for the legislature.” 1 Lewis, supra note 38, § 256, at 503. 
48 In re City of Brooklyn, 38 N.E. at 989. The Supreme Court reached a similar conclu-
sion in Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles in 1923: “The necessity for appropriating private 
property for public use is not a judicial question. This power resides in the legislature, and 
may either be exercised by the legislature or delegated by it to public officers.” 262 U.S. at 
709. 
49 See R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 96 (R.I. 2006). 
50 See id. at 101. 
51 See, e.g., Rindge Co., 262 U.S. at 705–06; Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., LLC., 
768 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. 2002). 
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of public use determinations to the point that such review is little more 
than a routine linguistic exercise.52 Kelo is merely the capstone in a long 
progression of Supreme Court decisions leading to this endpoint.53 
B. Deference in the Federal Courts: Kelo and Its Predecessors 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo highlights the deferential 
stance that the federal courts take to legislative determinations of pub-
lic use under the U.S. Constitution. Kelo addressed the difficult ques-
tion of how to define public use.54 Was a redevelopment project that 
resulted in property being taken from one set of private owners only to 
end up in the hands of another set of private owners a legitimate public 
use if undertaken to revitalize an economically depressed area?55 Public 
use can be defined narrowly as use by the public (such as a taking for a 
road, dam, or school), or broadly as a public purpose or public benefit 
(such as a taking for blight remediation).56 The Supreme Court his-
torically leaned toward the broad view of the public use power, al-
though until Kelo it had not directly addressed the issue.57 The Kelo 
                                                                                                                      
 
52 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (“[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is 
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compen-
sated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”). 
53 See Zeiner, supra note 3, at 205–07. 
54 See 545 U.S. at 477. 
55 See id. at 473–75. As the Kelo Court recognized, some takings clearly involve public 
use, but other takings present much more complicated scenarios. See id. at 477. Justice 
Stevens, writing for the Kelo majority, noted that at one end of a spectrum, taking private 
property for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private property owner is clearly 
unconstitutional, regardless of the compensation paid. Id. At the other end of that spec-
trum, a taking for clear public use (such as a road, dam, or school), accompanied by just 
compensation, is clearly valid. Id. The difficulty lies in determining the presence of public 
use in the cases, such as Kelo, that lie in the middle of those two extremes. See id. at 477–80. 
Even when state courts acknowledge the need to defer to the legislature, most consider the 
notion of at least limited judicial review. In Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp., for 
example, the court stated that the judiciary’s role in reviewing is to “focus primarily on 
benefits the public hopes to realize from the proposed taking.” 930 A.2d 160, 173 (D.C. 
2007). At one extreme, if the property is transferred to another private party, the stated 
public benefits could be pretextual. Id. at 173–74. At the other extreme, if the trial record 
discloses an overwhelming public purpose that substantially benefits the public, the courts 
must defer to the legislature’s judgment. Id. at 174. These extremes illustrate the easy 
cases; the more difficult cases lie in the middle of these two extremes. Id. 
56 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477, 480; Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Pol-
icy, Judicial Deference to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards Project, 
42 Urb. Law. 287, 331–32 (2010). 
57 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477–80; see, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 
U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (noting “the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test” 
for public use); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161–63 (1896) (stating that 
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Court explicitly adopted the broader view of public use in the Fifth 
Amendment as a public purpose.58 
                                                                                                                     
 More importantly for the objectives of this Article, the Kelo Court 
emphasized the minor role that the federal judiciary plays, and the 
starring role that the legislature and state courts play, in determining 
what the public good demands.59 In so doing, the Kelo Court made 
clear the high degree of judicial deference to legislative determinations 
of public use in federal takings cases.60 The Court highlighted the 
“‘great respect’” that the federal courts should pay legislatures in iden-
tifying local needs,61 stating: “‘When the legislature’s purpose is legiti-
mate and its means not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical 
debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than the debate over the 
wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be car-
ried out in the federal courts.’”62 Rather, the Court historically has “af-
ford[ed] legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs 
justify the use of the takings power.”63
 
In short, the federal courts defer 
to the legislative branch, whether state or federal, in determinations of 
public use and apply a rational basis standard of review that is notori-
ously deferential.64 
 The deferential approach to public use determinations evolved 
over time.65 Early federal decisions, in fact, stressed that determinations 
of public use were judicial, not legislative, questions.66 In Fallbrook Irri-
gation District v. Bradley, decided in 1896, the Supreme Court noted that 
legislative determinations of public use are not conclusive but rather 
public use is a question that the justices “must decide . . . in accordance 
with [their] views of constitutional law.”67 In 1908, the Supreme Court, 
in Hairston v. Danville & Western Railway Co., stated further that “[t]he 
one and only principle in which all courts seem to agree is that the na-
 
public use means furthering a public interest); Nichols, supra note 25, § 7.02[2]–[3], at 7-29 
to -37 (discussing broad and narrow views of eminent domain). 
58 545 U.S. at 479–80. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that “this ‘Court 
long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the 
general public.’” Id. at 479 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244). Rather, public purpose or 
public benefit suffices. Id. at 480. 
59 See id. at 489–90. 
60 See id. at 488–90. 
61 See id. at 482 (quoting Hairston, 208 U.S. at 606–07). 
62 Id. at 488 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43). 
63 See id. at 483. 
64 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
65 See id. at 479–83 (majority opinion). 
66 See, e.g., Hairston, 208 U.S. at 606; Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at 298. 
67 164 U.S. at 159. 
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ture of the uses, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial ques-
tion.”68 
 The Court soon began to chip away at the notion that public use 
determinations were judicial questions. In 1923, the Court indicated in 
Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles that although public use is a judicial 
question, “the determination of this question is influenced by local 
conditions; and this Court, while enforcing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, should keep in view the diversity of such conditions and regard 
with great respect the judgments of state courts upon what should be 
deemed public uses in any State.”69 Similarly, in Cincinnati v. Vester, de-
cided in 1930, the Court emphasized the role of the courts in making 
public use determinations under Fourteenth Amendment takings ques-
tions.70 Nonetheless, the Court also acknowledged the expertise of leg-
islatures and state courts in identifying local needs and making judg-
ments about public use in light of those needs.71 Yet, the Court went on 
to caution, “the question [of what is a public use] remains a judicial 
one which this Court must decide in performing its duty of enforcing 
the provisions of the Federal Constitution.”72 
 The abandonment of the substantive due process review of the 
Lochner era, however, caused the Supreme Court to retract its role in 
reviewing economic legislation, including takings questions.73 In its fa-
mous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Supreme 
Court indicated that fundamental individual rights, such as free speech 
and religious freedom, would receive a higher degree of due process 
scrutiny than property rights.74 Although state actions that potentially 
infringed upon fundamental rights would receive heightened scrutiny 
(strict or intermediate), economic legislation was to be presumed valid 
and to be reviewed under a cursory rational basis test.75 
                                                                                                                      
 
68 208 U.S. at 606. 
69 See 262 U.S. at 705–06. 
70 See 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Charles E. Cohen, The Abstruse Science: Kelo, Lochner, and Representation Reinforce-
ment in the Public Use Debate, 46 Duq. L. Rev. 375, 391–99 (2008). “The Lochner era . . . refers 
to a period spanning from roughly the 1870s through the late 1930s, when the Supreme 
Court employed a now-discredited interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to invalidate a significant number of government economic and pub-
lic welfare regulations.” Id. at 378–79. 
74 See 304 U.S. 144, 152–53, 152 n.4 (1938). 
75 See id. at 152, 152 n.4 (“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to pre-
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 The Carolene Products stance quickly translated into reduced pro-
tection for property rights in the eminent domain area.76 For example, 
in 1946, the Supreme Court stated in United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Welch: “We think that it is the function of Congress to decide 
what type of taking is for a public use and that the agency authorized to 
do the taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority.”77 
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion in Welch emphasiz-
ing that public use remained a judicial question, and suggesting that 
the majority undoubtedly recognized this.78 The majority’s deferential 
language, however, is a prescient precursor to later eminent domain 
cases decided by the Court.79 
 Certainly, by the middle of the twentieth century, the Court began 
defining its role in evaluating legislative determinations of public use in 
increasingly narrow terms. For example, the Supreme Court held in 
Berman v. Parker that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and 
inclusive” enough to allow the use of eminent domain to achieve any 
legislatively permissible end.80
 
The Berman Court unanimously upheld 
the taking of a department store in furtherance of an urban redevel-
opment plan for a blighted neighborhood, despite the property own-
ers’ objections that their property was not blighted.81 Justice William 
Douglas, writing for the Court, explained the relative roles of the fed-
eral courts and the legislature in public use determinations: “Subject to 
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the 
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such 
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the pub-
lic needs to be served by social legislation . . . .”82
 
The Berman Court 
emphasized the limited role of the federal courts in reviewing takings, 
                                                                                                                      
clude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experi-
ence of the legislators.”). 
76 See, e.g., Carmack, 329 U.S. at 242–43 (demonstrating deference to legislative author-
ity on a takings decision); Welch, 327 U.S. at 552 (showing deference to a legislative deci-
sion unless “it is shown to involve an impossibility”). 
77 327 U.S. at 551–52. 
78 Id. at 557–58 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“I assume that . . . the Court again rec-
ognizes the doctrine that whether a taking is for a public purpose is not a question beyond 
judicial competence.”). 
79 See Cohen, supra note 73, at 380–83 (discussing significant modern public use cases 
and the Supreme Court’s increasing deference to the legislature); Mansnerus, supra note 
13, at 428–32 (summarizing the evolution of the property and personal rights dichotomy 
in U.S. law). 
80 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
81 See id. at 31, 35–36. 
82 See id. at 32. 
2012] Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use Determinations 255 
finding that the judiciary’s role in evaluating whether the eminent do-
main power “is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely 
narrow one.”83
 
The Court refused to interfere with the legislature’s de-
termination that slum clearance was in the public benefit, stating 
“Congress and its authorized agencies have . . . take[n] into account a 
wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them.”84 
 The Supreme Court again addressed the public use issue three 
decades later in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.85
 
Large landowners 
who controlled most of the privately-owned land in Hawaii challenged 
a state plan to condemn their land and sell it in fee to tenants then in 
possession.86 The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that, because private 
parties would ultimately own the land, the taking did not serve a public 
use.87 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
wrote a sweeping endorsement of the legislature’s power to take: “The 
‘public use’ requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sover-
eign’s police powers”88 and “[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associ-
ated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”89 
 Although the Midkiff Court emphasized the unconstitutionality of 
“purely private taking[s],”90 it also specifically adopted the rational ba-
sis standard for reviewing public use questions, stating that a taking 
would be upheld if it was “rationally related to a conceivable public pur-
pose.”91 The Midkiff Court couched this standard of review in very 
broad terms, stating that the federal courts must defer to a legislative 
determination of public use “‘until it is shown to involve an impossibil-
ity’”92 or “‘the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”93 The 
subsequent role of the federal courts in reviewing such determinations 
is very narrow: “When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its 
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates 
over the wisdom of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of 
other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in 
                                                                                                                      
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 33. 
85 See 467 U.S. at 229–31. 
86 See id. at 232–35. 
87 See id. at 243–44. 
88 Id. at 240. 
89 Id. at 242. 
90 Id. at 245. 
91 467 U.S. at 241. 
92 See id. at 240 (quoting Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 
(1925)). 
93 See id. at 241 (quoting Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 680). 
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the federal courts.”94 The Court further explained that a state legisla-
ture meets the public use requirement if it could have rationally be-
lieved that the legislation would meet its intended goal, regardless of 
whether the legislation actually does so.95 
 Moreover, the Midkiff Court explicitly grounded its lenient standard 
of review in concerns regarding deference and the relative roles of 
courts and legislatures.96 The Court explained that “[j]udicial deference 
is required because, in our system of government, legislatures are better 
able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of 
the taking power.”97 Furthermore, the Court drew no distinction be-
tween state and federal legislatures in terms of the level of deference 
that federal courts were required to show.98 Consequently, the Court 
advocated deference to any legislature, state or federal, which decided 
that the takings power was warranted to serve a public use.99 
 As a result, for the past several decades, federal courts have pro-
vided little relief for property owners challenging takings on public use 
grounds.100 The federal courts’ deferential stance spread to many state 
courts as well, resulting in a severe contraction in the ability of property 
owners to challenge public use determinations.101 As one student 
commentator summarized a quarter-century ago: 
[Courts] treat legislative authorization as raising the presump-
tion that a public use exists. Most courts ask at some point 
whether the condemning authorities were “arbitrary and ca-
pricious,” or, conversely, whether they might rationally have 
considered the proposed use to be public. Some courts have 
made clear their refusal to interfere unless a condemnation 
was undertaken in bad faith. Most do not articulate a single 
                                                                                                                      
94 See id. at 242–43. 
95 See id. at 242. One concern is that the general parameters of the rational basis test 
can lead to virtual rubberstamping of legislative decisions. See Gideon Kanner, The Public 
Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff”?, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 335, 360–62 (2006) 
(stating that the presumption of permissibility found in rational basis review “usually moti-
vates trial judges to see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil in such cases, even when 
[the cases] fail the ‘smell test’”). 
96 See 467 U.S. at 242–44. 
97 Id. at 244. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See Cohen, supra note 73, at 377–78. 
101 See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457–58 
(Mich. 1981) (discussing the limited role of the court in reviewing legislative decisions 
regarding eminent domain); Lopez, supra note 29, at 567–73 (summarizing the history of 
state courts’ deferential stance towards public use determinations). 
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test but in practice tend toward the soft side of a rational de-
fense standard. They uphold any condemnations not shown to 
be “wholly arbitrary” or “manifestly irrational,” or they cite the 
[Supreme Court’s] proposition that the legislature’s judgment 
is “well-nigh conclusive.”102 
The commentator also explained that the practical effect of the adop-
tion of a lenient standard of review is a reduction of the courts’ role in 
the protection of private property rights.103 The commentator noted 
that “[a]t some point, however, deference shades into abstention, the 
court averring that for institutional reasons it should not reconsider the 
government’s decision at all.”104 Theoretically, courts still have the 
power to evaluate whether a particular use is public, yet they have cho-
sen to leave these determinations to the political branches.105 
 While the Supreme Court’s extreme deference to legislative de-
terminations of public use was not eliminated in Kelo, it did show signs 
of erosion.106 The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that they should 
generally not attempt to “second-guess” the wisdom of local legisla-
tures.107 The Kelo Court splintered sharply, however, over the degree 
and type of deference appropriate in such instances—including a re-
treat from extreme judicial deference in a dissent written by Justice 
O’Connor, the author of the Midkiff opinion.108 
 Writing for the Kelo majority, Justice John Paul Stevens stated that 
public use in the Fifth Amendment meant public purpose, not use by 
the public,109 and that promoting economic development was a legiti-
mate public purpose.110 Justice Stevens seemed to recognize the dan-
                                                                                                                      
 
102 Mansnerus, supra note 13, at 426 (quoting City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 
P.2d 835, 846 (Cal. 1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Berman, 
348 U.S. at 32 (footnotes omitted). 
103 Mansnerus, supra note 13, at 424. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
107 See id. at 488–89 (majority opinion); id. at 498–99 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 
520 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
108 See id. at 482–83 (majority opinion); id. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Midkiff, 
467 U.S. at 231. 
109 See 545 U.S. at 479–80. 
110 See id. at 483–84. “Public use” is a term that historically has been subject to varying 
interpretations. See City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1129–36 (Ohio 2006) 
(describing the evolution of the term “public use”); Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public 
Abuse, 68 UMKC L. Rev. 49, 59–63 (1999) (discussing various interpretations and applica-
tions of the public use standard); Oswald, supra note 3, at 52–57 (summarizing changes in 
the public use doctrine over time). In the narrow and increasingly rejected view, public use 
is seen as requiring that the condemned property be taken only for projects where the 
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gers inherent in adopting the broad view of public use—he tried to 
narrow the holding by clarifying that pretextual public uses were con-
stitutionally forbidden111 and that the municipality could not take pri-
vate property “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a par-
ticular private party.”112 
 The Kelo Court directly addressed the issue of deference in judicial 
review of public use determinations.113 The Kelo majority emphasized 
the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments” 
of public use.114 The majority grounded its position in notions of fed-
eralism, stressing the “‘great respect’” that the federal courts “owe to 
state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public needs.”115 
The Court summarized as follows: “For more than a century, our public 
use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive 
scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining 
what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”116 The majority 
therefore adhered to the rational relationship test that it traditionally 
applies to takings—asking if the taking is rationally related to a con-
ceivable public purpose.117 
                                                                                                                     
 Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence did not argue that the ra-
tional basis standard of review should be completely jettisoned, but em-
phasized that the public use clause required “meaningful rational-basis 
review.”118 He called for a heightened standard of review—a higher 
standard than the rational basis test set forth in Berman and Midkiff—for 
 
public may use the property acquired, such as roads, dams, parks, or schools. See Nichols, 
supra note 25, § 7.02[1]–[2], at 7-26 to -32. Under the broader view, public use is treated as 
coterminous with public purpose or public advantage, thus allowing the condemnation of 
private property to further the public good or general welfare, or to secure a public bene-
fit. See id. § 7.02[3], at 7-33 to -37. 
111 See 545 U.S. at 478. Justice Kennedy, who joined the 5–4 majority opinion, wrote a 
separate concurrence in which he agreed “that transfers intended to confer benefits on 
particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, 
are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.” Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
112 See id. at 477. The Court stated that “a one-to-one transfer of property, executed 
outside the confines of an integrated development plan . . . would certainly raise a suspi-
cion that a private purpose was afoot.” Id. at 487. 
113 See id. at 480. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 482 (quoting Hairston, 208 U.S. at 607). In Kelo, the local legislature found 
that economic development would lead to increased jobs and tax revenue as well as revi-
talization of an economically depressed city, even though all concerned agreed that the 
plaintiffs’ properties were not themselves blighted. See id. at 472, 475. 
116 Id. at 483. 
117 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488. 
118 See id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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a narrow category of cases in which “impermissible favoritism” seemed 
to be a risk.119 
 The two dissents in Kelo, by contrast, took a much narrower view of 
the appropriate degree of deference.120 Justice O’Connor wrote a dis-
sent, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin 
Scalia and Clarence Thomas, in which she took strong issue with the 
majority’s treatment of deference, finding that the lax standard es-
poused by the majority rendered the public use clause a virtual nul-
lity.121 She underscored the point that for the public use requirement 
to remain meaningful, there was need for some independent judicial 
check on how the political branches construed public use.122 Justice 
O’Connor explained: “We give considerable deference to legislatures’ 
determinations about what governmental activities will advantage the 
public. But where the political branches are the sole arbiters of the 
public-private distinction, the Public Use Clause would amount to little 
more than hortatory fluff.”123 Justice O’Connor acknowledged that in 
certain circumstances property could be taken to be used for purposes 
that ultimately turned out to be private.124 She also acknowledged that 
the Court would defer to legislative judgments about public purpose.125 
But, in order to preserve the integrity of the Fifth Amendment, she ar-
gued, the courts must retain and use their “extremely narrow” role in 
reviewing legislative determinations of what constitutes a public use.126 
 Justice Thomas’s dissent went a step further, arguing that a public 
use existed only when the public had the legal right to use the property 
after the taking—in effect adopting the narrow view of public use.127 
He provided a detailed analysis of the development of the Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
119 Id. at 493 (“There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected imper-
missible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or other-
wise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.”). Justice Kennedy noted, 
however, that Kelo did not raise such concerns of impermissible favoritism because of am-
ple evidence that the city had planned the project with the goal of economic development 
and without the intent to benefit any particular private party. See id. at 491–92. 
120 See id. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 517 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
121 See id. at 494, 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
122 See id. at 497. 
123 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor also argued for 
the middle ground between the broad and narrow views of public use, stating that prop-
erty should be taken only where it “directly achieve[s] a public benefit.” See id. at 500. 
124 See id. at 499. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. at 500 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240). 
127 See id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he government may take property only 
if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.”). 
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Court’s deferential stance on legislative determinations of public use,128 
characterizing the Supreme Court’s stance on both the adoption of the 
broad definition of public use and deference as deriving from “two 
misguided lines of precedent.”129 He wrote that “[t]here is no justifica-
tion . . . for affording almost insurmountable deference to legislative 
conclusions that a use serves a ‘public use.’”130 As a result, the Court’s 
position on judicial review of property rights was inherently inconsis-
tent and incongruous: “[I]t is backwards to adopt a searching standard 
of constitutional review for nontraditional property interests, such as 
welfare benefits, while deferring to the legislature’s determination as to 
what constitutes a public use when it exercises the power of eminent 
domain, and thereby invades individuals’ traditional rights in real prop-
erty.”131 He concluded that “it is most implausible that the Framers in-
tended to defer to legislatures as to what satisfies the Public Use Clause, 
uniquely among all the express provisions of the Bill of Rights.”132 Jus-
tice Thomas thus explicitly reclaimed a significant role for judicial re-
view, stating: “[A] court owes no deference to a legislature’s judgment 
concerning the quintessentially legal question of whether the govern-
ment owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the taken property.”133 
 The majority opinion in Kelo stands for both the adoption of the 
broad view of public use at the federal level and confirmation of a def-
erential standard of review by federal courts of public use determina-
tions.134 The net result of the combination of these two positions has 
been a noticeable contraction in the federal courts’ role in protecting 
private property rights.135 The presumption of permissibility found in 
the rational basis review affirmed in Kelo leads the federal courts to 
leave questions of public use to the legislature and gives discontented 
property owners little to pursue in the way of judicial redress in federal 
court.136 
                                                                                                                      
128 See id. at 515–20. 
129 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
130 Id. at 517. 
131 Id. at 518 (citation omitted). 
132 Id. at 517–18. 
133 Id. at 517. 
134 See id. at 480 (majority opinion). 
135 See Hafetz, supra note 3, at 3102–06. 
136 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480, 487–88. 
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C. Deference in the Lower Federal Courts Post-Kelo 
 Post-Kelo, federal court decisions reflect the deferential stance to-
ward legislative takings mandated by the Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo line 
of precedent. For example, in Goldstein v. Pataki, decided in 2008, the 
Second Circuit noted that the federal courts’ focus shifted over the past 
century: “[B]oth in doctrine and in practice, the primary mechanism 
for enforcing the public-use requirement has been the accountability of 
political officials to the electorate, not the scrutiny of the federal 
courts.”137 Thus, the Goldstein court concluded, the federal courts 
should look at what type of government action creates a taking and 
what amount of compensation is needed to be just.138 The federal 
courts, however, should leave the public use determination to the legis-
lature “in all but the most extreme cases.”139 The Second Circuit ac-
knowledged that the federal courts do play a role in the public use de-
bate, but noted that the role “is ‘an extremely narrow one.’”140 
 In Carole Media LLC v. New Jersey Transit Corp., also decided in 2008, 
a public corporation established by the New Jersey legislature was sued 
for revoking billboard licenses without proper compensation.141 The 
Third Circuit made it clear that the court would defer to the legislature 
so long as there was not a glaring example of a transfer for pure private 
gain.142 And, once a public purpose was shown, the court essentially 
abandoned any further duty to review the legislature’s actions, stating 
“the Supreme Court has made it clear that the means of executing the 
[challenged] project are for the [legislature] alone to determine, once 
the public purpose has been established.”143 
 Similarly, in 2010, in Fideicomiso De La Tierra Del Caño Martin Peña v. 
Fortuño, the First Circuit acknowledged that there is a place for chal-
lenges to takings but emphasized that it was not the courts’ place to 
second-guess legislative determinations of the best mechanisms for ac-
complishing clear public policy objectives.144 The court concluded that 
“[p]ublic policy disagreements about the best of several rational means 
                                                                                                                      
137 516 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2008). 
138 Id. at 57. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32). 
141 550 F.3d 302, 304–05 (3d Cir. 2008). 
142 See id. at 309–11. 
143Id. at 311 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33). 
144 604 F.3d 7, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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to accomplish legitimate public purposes are not the grist of a Takings 
Clause claim.”145 
 Likewise, in Hsiung v. City & County of Honolulu the federal trial 
court refused to invalidate certain city ordinances that significantly al-
tered condemnation procedures.146 The court quoted Kelo and Midkiff 
in stating that when the legislature’s purpose “is legitimate, and its 
means are not irrational,” the federal courts are not to engage in de-
bates over the wisdom of the takings.147 Should the state wish to restrict 
its power of eminent domain beyond that countenanced by the U.S. 
Constitution, it was free to do so, but the federal courts would not in-
terfere with the state’s sovereignty.148 
II. The Expanding Role of the State Courts in Public Use Cases 
 Kelo is one of those relatively rare Supreme Court opinions where 
the American public not only took note of what the Court said, but re-
acted passionately to the Court’s decision.149 In this instance, the public 
response was one of outrage.150 The vocal public outcry prompted 
forty-three states to adopt laws that would (purportedly, at least) temper 
the expansive condemnation power espoused in Kelo.151 Most of these 
post-Kelo state laws focused on narrowing the broad definition of public 
use adopted by the Supreme Court—the state laws sought to limit tak-
ings for economic development and takings where private property was 
to be transferred to another private owner.152 A few state statutes, how-
                                                                                                                      
 
145 Id. at 18. The court emphasized the “necessarily deferential” standard of review ap-
plied to public use questions. Id. (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43; Pataki, 516 F.3d at 57–
58). 
146 378 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260–61, 1265–66 (D. Haw. 2005). 
147 Id. at 1265–66 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43)). 
148 Id. 
149 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (holding that the city’s 
condemnation was for the “public use”); Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the 
Many, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 2005, at B2. 
150 See Coleman, supra note 149, at B2. One noteworthy failed grass-roots effort in-
volved an attempt to condemn Justice Souter’s home in New Hampshire because he voted 
with the Kelo majority. See id. 
151 See Harvey M. Jacobs & Ellen M. Bassett, After “Kelo”: Political Rhetoric and Policy Re-
sponses, Land Lines (Lincoln Inst. of Land & Pol’y, Cambridge, Mass.) Apr. 2010, at 14, 
15. Alabama was one state that narrowed the broad definition of public use as a direct 
response to anti-Kelo sentiment. See Ala. Code §§ 18-1B-1 to -2 (2011) (noting that the 
state legislature’s intent was to limit the expansive reach of takings under state statutes “in 
light of the decision and certain opinions recently announced by the United States Su-
preme Court”). 
152 See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. 
L. Rev. 2100, 2114–48 (2009) (describing the different types of legislative responses from 
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ever, focused on the issue of judicial deference to legislative determina-
tions, which state courts have addressed in a handful of notable post-
Kelo opinions discussed below. 
A. State v. Federal Views on Deference 
 Nationwide, many condemnations proceed at the state level, where 
they are undertaken by state or local governmental entities.153 Al-
though the avenue for challenging state takings in federal court is very 
narrow as a result of the Kelo Court’s hands-off deferential approach,154 
property owners can and do turn to state courts, state constitutions, 
and state statutes for protection of private property rights.155 Moreover, 
those state constitutions and statutes can provide a higher degree of 
protection than that afforded by the U.S. Constitution, which sets a 
minimum, not a maximum, for protection of property rights.156 
 In particular, state courts are not bound by the Supreme Court’s 
determinations concerning public use in the federal context or under 
the Constitution, nor are they bound by federal notions of defer-
ence.157 The Kelo Court noted this, stating that “nothing in our opinion 
                                                                                                                      
 
states). Most commentators, however, seem to agree that the post-Kelo state reforms are 
largely window dressings with little or no impact upon outcomes. See, e.g., Timothy Sande-
fur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 
Mich. St. L. Rev. 709, 712 (surveying new state laws in response to Kelo and concluding 
that political action is ineffective in addressing problems caused by eminent domain); 
Somin, supra, at 2103–05 (summarizing state legislative reforms passed in response to Kelo 
and explaining how the reforms are generally ineffective). 
153 Statistics on takings are notoriously hard to find because of the multitude of entities 
that may exercise the power, and because data regarding takings is generally not tracked 
by those entities. See Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, The Economic Impacts of Eminent Domain 3 
(Mar. 2012 draft), available at www.duke.edu/~dlc28/papers/EminentDomain.pdf (“Few 
centralized sources of data document the condemnation of property across jurisdictions 
exist since various levels of government, local, state, and federal, are able to invoke the 
power of eminent domain.”); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-28, Eminent 
Domain: Information About Its Uses and Effect on Property Owners and Commu-
nities Is Limited 8 (2006) (noting that “the lack of data precludes a determination of the 
extent to which eminent domain has been used across the nation”). 
154 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482–83. 
155 See Somin, supra note 152, at 2114–21 (describing state statutes on eminent domain); 
infra notes 157, 160–171 and accompanying text (examining state court cases and state con-
stitutions and discussing their respective protection of private property rights). 
156 See State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, 1003 (Wash. 2010) (“Supreme Court application of 
the United States Constitution establishes a floor below which state courts cannot go to 
protect individual rights. But states of course can raise the ceiling and afford greater pro-
tection under their own constitutions.”). 
157 See City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1136 (Ohio 2006) (“In addressing 
the meaning of the public-use clause in Ohio’s Constitution, we are not bound to follow 
the United States Supreme Court’s determinations of the scope of the Public Use Clause 
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precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of 
the takings power,” and observing that many states had indeed imposed 
public use requirements “stricter than the federal base line.”158 Subse-
quent state court opinions likewise have remarked on the higher de-
gree of protection potentially available under state constitutions or 
state statutes.159 
 Of course, Kelo’s declaration that states could set higher protec-
tions for private property rights than the U.S. Constitution afforded was 
by no means new law.160 Kelo simply highlighted the role that state stat-
utes and constitutions could play by announcing the limited protection 
available under the U.S. Constitution and explicitly pointing to state 
law as an alternative.161 Many state courts had already recognized that 
their state constitutions or state statutes prohibited exercises of emi-
nent domain that would pass muster under the U.S. Constitution.162 
                                                                                                                      
 
in the federal constitution . . . .”); McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1126 
(Nev. 2006) (providing that “‘states may expand the individual rights of their citizens un-
der state law beyond those provided under the Federal Constitution’”) (quoting State v. 
Bayard, 71 P.3d 498, 502 (Nev. 2003)); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 651 
(Okla. 2006) (noting that the state’s “constitutional eminent domain provisions place 
more stringent limitations on governmental eminent domain power than the limitations 
imposed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,” and that Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Illinois, South Carolina, Michigan, and Maine have reached similar outcomes 
based on their state constitutions) (citation omitted); Evans v. Twp. of Maplewood, No. L-
6910-06, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2982, at *23–28 (Law Div. July 27, 2007) (noting 
that although the Supreme Court has stated that the U.S. Constitution permits takings for 
economic development, the New Jersey Constitution “does not go so far”). 
158 545 U.S. at 489. 
159 See, e.g., Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1136 (differentiating between the Takings Clause in 
the Ohio Constitution and “the sweeping breadth that the Supreme Court attributed to 
the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause.”); McCarran, 137 P.2d at 1126 (stating that 
under the Nevada Constitution the first right established is “the protection of a land-
owner’s inalienable rights to acquire, possess and protect private property” to which there 
is no federal corollary provision). 
160 See 545 U.S. at 489. 
161 Id. 
162 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, at 475 (Mich. 
1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 
(Mich. 2004). As Justice Ryan noted in his dissent in Poletown, the deferential stance on 
review of public use determinations adopted by federal courts in no way mandates a simi-
lar level of deference by the state courts. Id; see Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 903 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003) (“The federal constitution provides considerably less protection against emi-
nent domain than our Constitution provides.”); Lowery, 136 P.3d at 651 nn.19, 20 (listing 
pre-Kelo decisions acknowledging greater rights either under state constitutions or under 
state statutes); Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (S.C. 1978) 
(“While in other jurisdictions the power of eminent domain may be exercised for a public 
purpose, benefit or the public welfare, the courts of South Carolina have adhered to a 
strict interpretation of our constitutional provision.”); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of 
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The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, in overruling its contro-
versial Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit163 decision in County 
of Wayne v. Hathcock in 2004, explicitly renounced the rational basis 
standard of review.164 The court stated that it had “never employed the 
minimal standard of review in an eminent domain case” and “always 
made an independent determination of what constitutes a public use for 
which the power of eminent domain may be utilized.”165 Although the 
court’s pronouncement smacks somewhat of revisionist history, it was 
certainly within the Michigan Supreme Court’s purview to reject the 
rational basis standard and to adopt a higher, less deferential standard 
of review under its own state constitution.166 
 Although it may seem obvious that state courts can impose higher 
standards and afford greater protection under state law, it is a point 
that needs periodic reiteration, as state courts (and likely, the lawyers 
who argue before them) do occasionally lose sight of this important 
principle. There are numerous examples in which state courts have 
mistakenly asserted they were constrained by the Supreme Court’s def-
erential stance.167 
                                                                                                                      
 
Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 190 (Wash. 2000) (“[T]he structural differences allow Washing-
ton courts to forbid the taking of private property for private use even in cases where the 
Fifth Amendment may permit such takings.”). 
163 304 N.W.2d at 459–60 (per curiam) (holding that condemning to protect jobs and 
economic viability was a valid public use). 
164 684 N.W.2d at 785. 
165 Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 475 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)). 
166 See id. 
167 See, e.g., Lockridge v. Adrian, 638 So. 2d 766, 771 (Ala. 1994) (“Thus, if a legislature, 
state or federal, determines there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking 
power, courts must defer to its determination that the taking will serve a public use.”); 
Natural Res. Comm’n of Ind. v. AMAX Coal Co., 638 N.E.2d 418, 429 (Ind. 1994) (assess-
ing the constitutionality of a taking only in terms of the U.S. Constitution and not the 
Indiana Constitution); New Orleans Redev. Auth. v. Burgess, 16 So. 3d 569, 575 (La. Ct. 
App. 2009) (holding that Midkiff “enunciated the respect which the courts must give to the 
legislative branch”) (emphasis added) (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 
243–44 (1984)); Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459 (stating that under Berman, “when a legisla-
ture speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms ‘well-nigh conclusive’”) (quot-
ing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 
1, 10–11 (Nev. 2003) (suggesting the court is bound by Midkiff’s standard of legislative 
deference); City of Long Branch v. Brower, MON-L-4987–05, 2006 WL 1746120, *18 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. June 22, 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. City of Long Branch v. 
Anzalone, A-0067–06T2, 2008 WL 3090052 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 7, 2008) (hold-
ing that according to Midkiff “[t]he courts are constrained to defer to the governing 
body”); see also Michael Bindas et al., The Washington Supreme Court and the State Constitution: 
A 2010 Assessment, 46 Gonz. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2011) (“Because there is frequently a more ex-
tensive body of law interpreting the Federal Constitution, lawyers may tend to focus their 
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 Over three decades ago, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an 
influential Harvard Law Review article about what he saw as a regretta-
ble retraction by the Supreme Court in constitutional protections.168 
Justice Brennan encouraged litigants to protect their individual liber-
ties by looking beyond the U.S. Constitution, noting that state constitu-
tions often provide greater protections of individual liberties than fed-
eral law.169 As Justice Brennan noted, state courts have often deviated 
from Supreme Court opinions despite similar or even identical lan-
guage in their state constitution and the U.S. Constitution.170 In the 
words of the Hawaii Supreme Court: “While this results in a divergence 
of meaning between words which are the same in both federal and state 
constitutions, the system of federalism envisaged by the [U.S.] Consti-
tution tolerates such divergence where the result is greater protection of 
individual rights under state law than under federal law.”171 
 Although Justice Brennan was concerned primarily with what he 
perceived to be erosions of individual rights under the Bill of Rights,172 
the concerns he raised are equally applicable in the context of the Tak-
ings Clause—and the solution he offered of seeking protection under 
state, rather than federal, constitutional provisions is equally practica-
ble.173 Justice Brennan, in fact, presaged the Kelo aftermath and subse-
quent state-level rejection of Kelo’s holding when he suggested that state 
court judges and practitioners should closely scrutinize federal deci-
sions in the eminent domain realm before using them to interpret state 
constitutional counterparts.174 Justice Brennan concluded with an ex-
plicit call for lawyers to consider the protections offered by state consti-
tutions, stating that “it would be most unwise these days not also to raise 
state constitutional questions.”175 
                                                                                                                      
arguments on what is required by the Federal Constitution, and treating the state constitu-
tion as simply a restatement of the Federal Constitution.”). 
168 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 489, 490–91 (1977). 
169 Id. at 491. Justice Brennan articulated a similar thought in a dissent in Michigan v. 
Mosley. 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that states have the power 
to “impose higher standards” for “police practices under state law than is required by the 
Federal Constitution”). 
170
 
Brennan, supra note 168, at 500. 
171 State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Haw. 1974). 
172 Brennan, supra note 168, at 492. Justice Brennan’s article focused on equal protec-
tion, procedural due process protections for governmental benefits, and the “specific guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights against encroachment by state action.” Id. at 491–92. 
173 See id. at 491–92, 502–04. 
174 Id. at 502. 
175 Id. 
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 Scholars subsequently labeled the movement toward increased 
state protection of individual rights based on state constitutional provi-
sions “new judicial federalism.”176 It is not really necessary to expound 
on the development of such theoretical language, however, to under-
stand the trend. States have always been free to grant more protection 
than the U.S. Constitution mandates.177 It is simply that the retreat by 
the Supreme Court on federal protection of private property rights 
makes pursuit of state protections more appealing to litigants, thus 
bringing heightened attention to state activities. This is precisely what 
we now see happening in the eminent domain arena. 
B. State Court Approaches to Deference 
 Post-Kelo developments in state courts suggest that takings litigants 
are having some success in following Justice Brennan’s suggested strat-
egy of seeking protection under their state constitutions or statutes.178 
The most detailed post-Kelo analysis of the role of deference in state 
takings is found in City of Norwood v. Horney, a 2006 decision by the 
Ohio Supreme Court.179 The Norwood court deliberately availed itself of 
                                                                                                                      
 
176 See Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1191, 1191–94 
(1977); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, State Constitutional Law, New Judicial Federalism, and 
the Rehnquist Court, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 339, 341 (2004); Anthony B. Sanders, The “New 
Judicial Federalism” Before Its Time: A Comprehensive Review of Economic Substantive Due Process 
Under State Constitutional Law Since 1940 and the Reasons for its Recent Decline, 55 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 457, 459–60 (2005); G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1097, 1098–99 (1997). 
177 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
178 See, e.g., City of Stockton v. Marina Towers LLC, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909, 925 (Ct. App. 
2009) (failing to provide adequate project description in resolution of necessity renders 
proposed taking invalid under state statute); Mayor of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 
356 (Md. 2007) (striking down a city’s attempt to use quick-take condemnation procedures 
for an urban renewal project because of lack of evidence that the buildings at issue were 
“immediately injurious” to public health and safety, and noting that “the evidence pre-
sented below of public use was sparse”); McCarran, 137 P.3d at 1126 (finding a regulatory 
taking occurred under the state constitution and noting that Kelo recognized that states 
may expand their citizens’ rights beyond those provided in the U.S. Constitution); Gallen-
thin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 449 (N.J. 2007) (striking 
down a taking based on a determination by the local government that land was in need of 
redevelopment on grounds that state constitution permitted government redevelopment 
of only blighted areas); Lowery, 136 P.3d at 650–51 (stating that takings for economic de-
velopment purposes do not satisfy the state constitution or state statute); Benson v. State, 
710 N.W.2d 131, 146 (S.D. 2006) (finding that the state constitution and case law provide 
property owners with more protection than the U.S. Constitution because the state applies 
the narrower rather than the broader definition of public use). 
179 853 N.E.2d at 1129–42. See generally Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent 
Domain’s “Summer of Scrutiny,” 59 Ala. L. Rev. 561 (2008) (noting Norwood as an example of 
a post-Kelo reform); Andrew S. Han, Note, From New London to Norwood: A Year in the Life 
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Kelo’s invitation to view federal constitutional protections in the takings 
area as a minimum, not a maximum.180 In so doing, the Norwood court 
issued an unusually detailed and thoughtful decision analyzing the rela-
tive roles of the judiciary and legislature in eminent domain matters.181 
Given the federal courts’ explicit retreat on takings issues, Norwood pro-
vides a constructive example of how state courts might rediscover and 
revitalize their role in protection of property rights.182 
 Norwood, like Kelo, involved a taking for economic redevelopment 
purposes.183 The trial court found that the use of eminent domain for 
purposes of urban renewal was constitutional as a valid public use under 
both Ohio and Supreme Court precedent, and upheld the condemna-
tion of the property owners’ parcels.184
 
The Ohio Court of Appeals af-
firmed, noting first that the finding of the city council regarding the 
deteriorating nature of the area was entitled to judicial deference185 
and, second, that the redevelopment plan was a valid public use under 
the Ohio Constitution.186 In effect, the intermediate appellate court 
foreshadowed the reasoning of Kelo, which was issued by the U.S. Su-
preme Court a few weeks later.187 
 However, the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously reversed.188 The 
court did not hesitate to confront directly and in detail the thorny issue 
of the degree of deference courts should afford legislative determina-
tions of public use.189 Although Kelo was issued before Norwood, the 
                                                                                                                      
 
of Eminent Domain, 57 Duke L.J. 1449 (2008) (discussing the Ohio Supreme Court’s repu-
diation of Kelo in Norwood); Case Note, Eminent Domain-Public Use-Ohio Supreme Court Holds 
That Economic Development Cannot by Itself Satisfy the Public Use Limitation of the Ohio Constitu-
tion—City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006), 120 Harv. L. Rev. 643 
(2006) (examining the facts, holding, and importance of the case). 
180 Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1122. 
181 See id. at 1122, 1137–42. 
182 See id. at 1129. 
183 Id. at 1122; see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472. 
184 Norwood v. Horney, 830 N.E.2d 381, 391 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), overruled by 853 
N.E.2d 1115. 
185 Id. at 388, 394. 
186 See id. at 391. 
187 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90. 
188 Norwood, 853 NE.2d at 1153. 
189 See id. at 1137. The Norwood court also specifically addressed the other major issue 
raised in Kelo—the scope of public use. See id. at 1135–36. The court highlighted the risk of 
expanding public use to include takings intended solely for economic development pur-
poses, finding that such a broad notion of public use would have the effect of eradicating 
the public use limitation of the Ohio Constitution. See id. at 1135–36. Thus, the Norwood 
court held that economic development alone cannot satisfy the public use requirement of 
the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 1142. The court then turned to the city’s finding that the area 
was “deteriorating” to determine whether that finding would justify the use of the eminent 
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Ohio Supreme Court declined to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s rea-
soning, instead issuing an opinion in which it delved into considerable 
detail about the nature of public use and the role of judicial deference 
in state takings cases.190 The court noted the “inherent tension” be-
tween the state’s power of eminent domain and the need to protect 
individual private property rights.191 
 Norwood and similar recent state court decisions highlight two key 
insights into judicial deference to the legislature in eminent domain 
cases. First, the degree to which a court specifically and openly ap-
proaches the issue of public use as a judicial question influences the 
degree of judicial scrutiny the taking receives.192 The degree of scrutiny 
affects the level of deference afforded legislative decision making and 
the likelihood that the taking will survive a challenge.193 Second, defer-
ence notions are closely tied to separation of powers principles.194 Dis-
cussion of judicial review of public use determinations necessarily im-
plicates the relationship between, and relative roles of, legislatures and 
courts.195 Both factors, taken together, have a significant impact on the 
type of judicial review afforded to takings decisions and upon the de-
gree of judicial protection offered to private property rights within a 
given jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                      
domain power. Id. at 1145. The court found first that the term “deteriorating area” was 
void for vagueness because the city code failed to provide property owners and city officials 
with a sufficient definition of what constituted a “deteriorating area.” Id. Second, the court 
found that regardless of its void-for-vagueness finding, the standard was impermissible 
under Ohio precedent because it allowed the city to exercise the power of eminent do-
main based on a prediction that the property might pose a future threat. Id. The city code 
deemed an area “deteriorating” if it was or would be “deteriorating,” or was “in danger of 
deteriorating.” Id. Thus, the court struck down the City of Norwood’s exercise of eminent 
domain. Id. at 1146. 
190 See id. at 1122, 1130–46. 
191 Id. at 1130–31. The Northwest Ordinance initially, and the Ohio Constitution sub-
sequently, limited the state’s power of eminent domain based on “equitable considerations 
of just compensation and public use.” Id. at 1130. The Ohio Constitution actually phrases 
this requirement in language somewhat different from that of the U.S. Constitution: “Pri-
vate property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare . . . . 
[W]here private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefore shall first 
be made . . . . ” Ohio Const. art. I, § 19. 
192 See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1136–42; infra notes 196–223 and accompanying text. 
193 See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1136–42; infra notes 196–206 and accompanying text. 
194 See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1137–42; infra notes 224–254 and accompanying text. 
195 See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1137–42; infra notes 224–254 and accompanying text. 
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1. Public Use as a Judicial Question 
 The degree to which a state court explicitly views public use as a 
judicial question has an observable impact on the degree of protection 
afforded to private property rights within a jurisdiction. This is an in-
stance where the vocabulary used by the court greatly influences the 
outcome. Norwood is a prime example. The Norwood court discussed the 
relative roles of the courts and legislature in takings cases in detail.196 
The Ohio Supreme Court explained that the state’s lower courts had 
mistakenly interpreted the standard of review in takings cases as one of 
absolute deference to legislative determinations.197 Rather, the proper 
standard of review in Ohio requires that the court conduct an inde-
pendent review of the legislature’s decision to take.198 As the Norwood 
court noted, it is the role of the judiciary to delineate the limits of the 
legislature’s eminent domain power.199 Moreover, the court recognized 
that although its role is limited, it is crucial in reviewing state actions to 
ensure that the state takes no more than necessary to promote the pub-
lic use, and that the state proceeds fairly and effectuates takings without 
bad faith, pretext, discrimination, or criminal purposes.200 
 The Norwood court also acknowledged that legislatures should be 
afforded broad discretion in eminent domain matters; however, courts 
must ensure that the legislature’s actions remain within the scope of its 
authority, which is not abused or used in bad faith.201 The court em-
phasized the independent role of the judiciary, framing this role in the 
context of “the courts’ traditional role as guardian of constitutional 
rights and limits.”202 
 By couching its role in these terms, the Ohio Supreme Court put 
review of public use determinations squarely under the purview of the 
courts, not the legislature.203 Other states vary in how they approach 
                                                                                                                      
196 Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1137–39.  
197
 
Id. at 1136, 1138. 
198 Id. at 1138. 
199 Id. at 1137.  
200
 
Id. at 1138. 
201
 
Id. Justice Zarella also addressed this in his partial concurrence and partial dissent in 
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo. See 843 A.2d 500, 581, 582 (Conn. 2004) 
(Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Although 
Justice Zarella conceded that “[i]t is well established that judicial deference to determina-
tions of public use by state legislatures is appropriate,” he noted that “[n]evertheless, judicial 
deference to legislative declarations of public use does not require complete abdication of 
judicial responsibility.” Id. at 581–82. 
202 Norwood, 853 NE.2d at 1138–39 (stating that “we thus act with deference to legisla-
tive pronouncements, but we are independent of them”). 
203 See id. at 1138. 
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this issue. Although some state constitutions204
 
and statutes205
 
provide 
that public use is a judicial question, in other instances the issue is 
broached through judicial opinions.206 The bottom line is that a sur-
prising number of states have constitutional, statutory, or case law lan-
guage clearly assigning review of public use determinations to the judi-
ciary. 
                                                                                                                      
204
 
See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17 (“Whenever an attempt is made to take private 
property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be 
really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any 
legislative assertion that the use is public.”); Colo. Const. art. II, § 15 (“[W]henever an 
attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question 
whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and deter-
mined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.”); La. 
Const. art. I, § 4 (stating that no property shall be taken “by any private entity authorized 
by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary purpose” and “in such proceed-
ings, whether the purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial question”); Miss. 
Const. art. 3, § 17 (“[W]henever an attempt is made to take private property for a use 
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be a judi-
cial question, and, as such, determined without regard to legislative assertion that the use 
is public.”); Mo. Const. art. I, § 28 (“[W]hen an attempt is made to take private property 
for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall 
be judicially determined without regard to any legislative declaration that the use is pub-
lic.”); Okla. Const. art 2, § 24 (“In all cases of condemnation of private property for pub-
lic or private use, the determination of the character of the use shall be a judicial ques-
tion.”); Wash. Const. art. 1, § 16 (“Whenever an attempt is made to take private property 
for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public 
shall be a judicial question . . . . ”). But see Va. Const. art I, § 11 (“[T]he term ‘public uses’ 
[is] to be defined by the General Assembly . . . .”). 
205 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12–1132 (2011) (establishing that in takings, “the 
question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and 
determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public”); 
Okla. Stat. tit. 66 § 57 (2011) (“In all cases of condemnation of property for either public 
or private use, the determination of the character of the use shall be a judicial question 
. . . .”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 35.015 (2011) (limiting the circumstances under which private 
property can be taken, and providing that “[a] court shall independently determine 
whether a taking of property complies with the requirements of this section, without def-
erence to any determination made by the public body”); Wash. Rev. Code § 8.12.090 
(2012) (“Whenever an attempt is made to take private property, for a use alleged to be 
public . . . the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial 
question . . . .”). 
206 See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 493 (Ark. 1967) (“Whether or 
not a proposed use for which property is to be taken, even with legislative sanction, is a 
public or private use is a judicial question which the owner has a right to have determined 
by the courts.”); Bassett v. Swenson, 5 P.2d 722, 725 (Idaho 1931) (holding that what is a 
“public use” is a judicial question); Logan v. Stogdale, 24 N.E. 135, 136 (Ind. 1890) 
(“Whether the use is a public one is a judicial question, and not a legislative one . . . .”); 
R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 96 (R.I. 2006) (stating that “[i]t is well 
settled in this state that whether a taking constitutes a public use is a judicial question” and 
citing cases in support). 
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 Thus, state courts—even those without explicit constitutional or 
statutory provisions on point—are more likely than federal courts to 
treat public use determinations as a judicial question.207 Often, state 
courts see a meaningful role for themselves in reviewing whether a par-
ticular taking satisfies the public use requirement and resist attempts by 
state legislatures to reduce judicial power in this arena.208
 
For example, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Rhode Island Economic Development 
Corp. v. Parking Co.,
 
emphasized “the rebuttable nature of the legislative 
determination of public use” and affirmed the role of judicial review
 
when owners challenged public use decisions.209 The court must exam-
ine the particular factors in each case and approve those takings “de-
signed to protect the public health, safety and welfare,” even if the tak-
ings incidentally benefit private interests.210 The court emphasized that 
public use is nonetheless a judicial question that requires careful scru-
tiny of the good faith and due diligence on the part of the condem-
nor.211 In addition, the court declined to blindly defer to conclusory 
legislative statements of public use.212 
 Even when state statutory or constitutional language gives an ex-
plicit role to the courts in evaluating public uses, a court may reduce its 
role through judicial interpretation. The Washington Constitution, for 
                                                                                                                      
207 Compare Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (stating that the federal judiciary has an “extremely 
narrow” role in public use determinations), with High Ridge Ass’n, Inc. v. Cnty. Comm’rs 
of Carroll Cnty., Md., 660 A.2d 951, 956–57 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (stating that public 
use determinations are judicial questions and the legislature cannot simply declare a use to 
be public), and Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903, 911 (Mich. 1954) (“‘The 
question of whether the proposed use is a public use is a judicial one.’”) (quoting Cleve-
land v. City of Detroit, 33 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Mich. 1948)). 
208 See, e.g., High Ridge Ass’n, 660 A.2d at 955–57 (emphasizing that whether a use is a 
public use is a judicial question); Lakehead Pipe Line Co., 64 N.W.2d at 911 (stating that it is 
the role of the judiciary to determine whether the proposed use is a public use). However, 
some state courts still view questions of public use as a legislative question. See, e.g., Mount 
Laurel Twp. v. Mipro Homes, LLC, 878 A.2d 38, 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(“Whether a taking is for a public use ‘is largely a legislative question beyond the reach of 
judicial review except in the most egregious cases.’”) (quoting Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 
Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 93 (N.J. 2002)). 
209 892 A.2d at 101. 
210 Id. at 104. The court ultimately struck down the taking, finding it was motivated by 
an impermissible desire to increase revenue and not a legitimate public purpose. Id; see 
Bird & Oswald, supra note 13, at 113–22 (discussing the relationship between public use 
and necessity). 
211 R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp., 892 A.2d at 104–06. 
212 Id. at 103 (“[I]t is not the function of this Court to dissect a legislative declaration 
to glean a public purpose . . . . [W]e . . . continue to endorse ‘the well-established rule that 
what constitutes a public use is a judicial question.’”) (quoting Romeo v. Cranston Redev. 
Agency, 254 A.2d 426, 434 (R.I. 1969)). 
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example, appears to have a very clear statement of a substantial judicial 
role in reviewing takings determinations: “Whenever an attempt is 
made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the ques-
tion whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial 
question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative as-
sertion that the use is public . . . .”213 Despite this seemingly clear lan-
guage regarding the primacy of the judicial role in determining public 
use, the Washington Supreme Court has interpreted the judicial role to 
be narrower. In HTK Management, LLC v. Seattle Popular Monorail Author-
ity, decided mere months after Kelo, the majority of the Washington 
Supreme Court stated that legislative declarations of public use are “not 
dispositive,” but nonetheless are “entitled to great weight.”214 This was 
soon followed by the court’s decision in Central Puget Sound Regional 
Transit Authority v. Miller, where the majority stated that it would “show 
great deference to legislative determinations.”215 Thus, litigants seeking 
protection in state court must look beyond constitutional or statutory 
language to figure out the degree to which a court will involve itself in 
public use disputes.216 
 As discussed above, federal courts have a strong policy of defer-
ence to legislative determinations of public use.217 By contrast, state 
courts can, and many do, reject such a deferential stance.218 The Ohio 
Supreme Court in Norwood, while acknowledging the role of judicial 
deference to legislative determinations, also emphasized the impor-
tance of not abandoning the judicial role in public use questions, not-
ing that courts must ensure the legislature does not exceed its authority 
or abuse its power.219 
 Some courts seem to find it easier to employ judicial review in pre-
textual challenges. For example, in County of Hawai’i v. C&J Coupe Fam-
ily Ltd. Partnership, the condemning county argued that the court was 
only obligated to determine whether the condemnor “‘might reasonably 
have considered the use public, not whether the use is public.’”220 The Hawaii 
Supreme Court, however, stated that the lower courts had an obligation 
                                                                                                                      
213 Wash. Const. art. 1, § 16. 
214 121 P.3d 1166, 1175 (Wash. 2005) (citations omitted). 
215 128 P.3d 588, 593 & n.2 (Wash. 2006). 
216 See id. at 593 n.2; HTK Mgmt., 121 P.3d at 1175. 
217 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240–41; Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; supra 
notes 76–117 and accompanying text. 
218 See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1138. 
219 Id. 
220 198 P.3d 615, 637 (Haw. 2008) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Chiyo Ajimine, 39 Haw. 
543, 549 (1952)). 
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under both the state and U.S. constitutions to consider whether the 
asserted public purpose behind the taking was pretextual.221 Although 
economic development cases seem to attract the most allegations of 
pretext, the court noted that even “classic” public uses such as roads 
(the issue in this case) were subject to challenges on these grounds.222 
Similarly, in Middletown Township v. Lands of Stone, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court stated that the judiciary’s role was to look for the gov-
ernment’s real reasons for a taking and not to defer to governmental 
“lip service” or post-hoc justifications.223 
2. Deference as a Separation of Powers Issue 
 The level of judicial deference in takings cases can also be viewed 
as a separation of powers issue. The Washington Supreme Court, for 
example, noted in Miller that the court’s deferential standard of review 
evolved “[o]ut of respect for a coordinate branch of government,” and 
was thus a separation of powers notion.224 Unfortunately, this issue cuts 
both ways—in favor of both a more deferential and a less deferential 
review of public use determinations. The separation of powers doctrine 
requires that each branch of government respect the relative roles of 
the other branches. Conversely, the doctrine also requires that no 
branch relinquish its power or role to another. 
 The notion of the appropriate balance of power between the legis-
lature and the judiciary permeates early articulations of eminent do-
main law.225 Philip Nichols, the author of an influential early treatise on 
eminent domain law, emphasized the importance of courts not intrud-
ing into the legislatures’ realm, stating “[t]he exercise by a court of the 
power to nullify the wishes of the representatives of the people, enacted 
into law in solemn form, is indeed full of grave responsibility and not to 
be called into play indiscriminately.”226 Nichols articulated an early ver-
sion of the rational basis standard of review for public use, stating that 
the issue “is not whether the use for which the property is taken is pub-
                                                                                                                      
221 Id. at 638 (noting that the presumption that the legislature’s purpose is valid is not 
“unfettered,” and that under appropriate circumstances courts may consider whether a 
purported public use is pretextual). 
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Id. at 647. 
223 939 A.2d 331, 338 (Pa. 2007). 
224 128 P.3d at 593. 
225 1 Philip Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain: A Treatise on the Principles 
Which Affect the Taking of Property for the Public Use §§ 10–14, at 34–47 (2d ed. 
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lic, but whether the legislature might reasonably consider it public.”227 
Nichols acknowledged, however, that a court’s duty was to declare un-
constitutional any taking that lacked any “real and substantial relation 
to the public use.”228 
 The Norwood court viewed the separation of powers doctrine as en-
forcing, not limiting, the court’s role in public use disputes.229 The 
court noted that while the judiciary should afford some deference to 
legislative determinations of public use, the separation of powers doc-
trine would be violated if the judiciary simply acquiesced in every in-
stance to the legislature’s invocation of the police power.230 Each branch 
has its own respective role to play, and it ought not to abdicate that role 
to another branch.231 As the Norwood court stated, “[d]eferential review 
is not satisfied by superficial scrutiny.”232 Rather, “the separation-of-
powers doctrine ‘would be unduly restricted’ if the state could invoke 
the police power to virtually immunize all takings from judicial re-
view.”233 Thus, the court concluded that although a court’s ability to 
scrutinize takings cases is limited, “it clearly remains a critical constitu-
tional component.”234 
                                                                                                                     
 The U.S. Supreme Court seems to have adopted the opposite view, 
essentially stating that the remedy to abusive governmental action often 
lies in the ballot box and not the federal courtroom.235 In an 1876 deci-
sion, Munn v. Illinois, the Court stated that the way to protect against 
the legislature’s potential abuse of economic regulation is through “the 
polls, not . . . the courts.”236 Similarly, the Second Circuit noted in Gold-
stein v. Pataki that “the primary mechanism for enforcing the public-use 
requirement has been the accountability of political officials to the 
electorate, not the scrutiny of the federal courts.”237 
 Commentators, too, have argued that respect for the relative roles 
of the co-equal branches of government should lead courts to be reti-
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cent in intruding too far into legislative decision making.238 As noted by 
Professor John Hart Ely: 
When a court invalidates an act of the political branches on 
constitutional grounds . . . it is overruling [the legislature’s] 
judgment, and normally doing so in a way that is not subject 
to “correction” by the ordinary law making process. Thus the 
central function, and it is at the same time the central prob-
lem, of judicial review: a body that is not elected or otherwise 
politically responsible in any significant way is telling the peo-
ple’s elected representatives that they cannot govern as they’d 
like.239 
Thus, the reluctance to interfere with the political process may at least 
partially explain the refusal of some courts to review public use deter-
minations. 
 Moreover, relying upon the political process is no panacea as there 
is no assurance that elected officials are either wiser or more impartial 
in their decision making than the courts, or that the political process is 
effective in constraining legislators’ behavior.240 Professors William 
Riker and Barry Weingast note that “neither the Court nor legal schol-
arship has provided the theoretical underpinnings for the presumption 
of the adequacy of legislative judgment and, indeed, neither has even 
asked whether legislative judgment really works.”241 Riker and Wein-
gast, however, go on to conclude that heightened judicial scrutiny is not 
the answer either: “Judicial scrutiny that allows judges to substitute 
their own logic for that of the legislature merely transfers the problem 
of unpredictability and insecurity of economic rights from the legisla-
ture to the judicial stage; it does not solve the problem of protecting 
rights.”242 Riker and Weingast identified the problem in clear and com-
pelling terms, but the solution remains much more elusive. 
                                                                                                                      
238 See John Hart Ely, Democracy And Distrust 4–5 (1980). 
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240 See William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative 
Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 Va. L. Rev. 373, 378–79 
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 Indeed, hortatory calls for greater supervision of the legislative 
process by the judiciary are common, but roadmaps for doing that ef-
fectively and appropriately are hard to devise. Professor John Hart Ely, 
for example, argued that courts must oversee the democratic process, 
while conceding that when a court is convinced that the majority is not 
abusing the process, the legislative determination should stand.243
 
The 
vexatious question, of course, is how does a court determine that the 
process is not being abused? 
 In addition, the level of the governmental unit making the taking 
decision can also affect the standard of review applied by state courts. 
To many commentators and state courts, the more local the govern-
mental unit involved in the taking, the more likely that abuse of the 
political process may occur.244 In such instances, some state courts are 
more reluctant to apply a deferential standard of review and are more 
likely to scrutinize the government’s decision.245 The Oregon Supreme 
Court, for example, explained that because local governments are not 
comparable to state and federal legislatures, local governing decisions 
should not be presumed valid and “shielded from less than constitu-
tional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers.”246 
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245 Fasano v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973), overruled on other grounds 
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 State courts may also fear that local officials may be more subject 
to undue influence from private interests247 or that even a local con-
demning authority acting in “good faith” will fail to be objective when 
evaluating the wisdom of expropriating property to implement an eco-
nomic development that it itself developed.248 Another potential abuse 
that may arise from local takings decisions, identified by Professor Wil-
liam Fischel, is that “[l]ocal governments are more prone to majoritari-
anism,” due to less diverse electorates and fewer constitutional checks 
on majority rule than exist at higher levels of government.249 Thus, lo-
cal decisions to take pose the risk of overreaching by the majority as 
well as the potential for abuse by well-connected special interest groups. 
 The problems inherent in the relative roles of courts and legisla-
tures are laid out in stark relief in the takings arena.250 As described by 
Professor Thomas Merrill, historically, public use analysis has focused 
upon the ends—the purpose to which the property will be put once 
taken—as opposed to the means by which the government achieves its 
goal.251
 
As legislatures have increasingly turned their attention to socio-
economic regulation, however, the courts have become even more def-
erential to legislative determinations of the proper ends of govern-
ment.252 In large part, this can be traced to notions of separation of 
powers—questions regarding the proper ends of government to “de-
mand an exercise in high political theory that most courts today are 
unwilling (or unable) to undertake,”253
 
and so the courts often defer to 
the “more democratic” legislative and executive branches to address 
these difficult political questions.254 
 In sum, although notions of separation of powers and the respec-
tive roles of the judiciary and legislature underlie much of the analysis 
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in this area, these concepts are only marginally helpful in delineating 
where the lines between judicial and legislative questions should be 
drawn in the takings arena. 
Conclusion 
 The relative roles of the state and federal courts in protecting pri-
vate property rights are shifting. Half a century of Supreme Court 
precedent has established that property owners run grave risks in rely-
ing upon the U.S. Constitution or the federal courts for protection of 
their property interests in takings cases.255 It is perhaps too soon to 
sound a death knell for federal protection of property rights, as Kelo 
was a divisive 5–4 decision, and even slight shifts in the Court’s compo-
sition could alter future holdings in this area.256 Nonetheless, current 
property owners can count on little relief from the federal courts when 
it comes to their claims of unconstitutional takings.257 
 James Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers that “[g]overnment is 
instituted no less for the protection of the property, than of the persons 
of individuals.”258 Contrary to this lofty statement about the sanctity of 
private property, the stance regarding property rights protection that 
has evolved in recent decades in the federal courts in general, and in 
the Supreme Court in particular, is a curiously weak one.259 This per-
haps reflects the declining stature given to property rights by the fed-
eral courts vis-à-vis other types of rights, such as privacy rights or rights 
afforded to accused criminals.260 As Justice Thomas noted in his dissent 
in Kelo, it is hard to imagine the Supreme Court declining to address 
issues of alleged improprieties in police procedures in criminal cases by 
deferring to legislative determinations of fairness, or by calling upon 
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states to adopt more stringent standards.261 Yet, that is precisely what we 
find in the takings field. 
 Perhaps federal courts do not feel the same need to protect rights 
in eminent domain cases because of the constitutional guarantee of just 
compensation.262 Perhaps courts see the just compensation as an 
equivalency to private property rights, even though property owners do 
not.263 Speculation about the federal courts’ motivations, however, is 
unproductive with respect to the extent and type of relief property 
owners can hope for from the federal courts.264 We can see that the 
Supreme Court itself is not completely comfortable with where its path 
has taken it, as illustrated by both the split in Kelo and the Kelo major-
ity’s effort to avoid the more pressing problems created by its lenient 
standard of review—providing a pretext exception that is hard to ar-
ticulate and difficult to apply.265 
 Although we could propose new rules for the Supreme Court to 
adopt in this context, such proposals do little to assist property owners 
facing the difficult task of challenging takings today. The only realistic 
advice we can give such property owners is to turn to the state courts.266 
Justice Brennan, in a call to state courts to increase their own levels of 
scrutiny, stated that “state courts no less than federal courts are and 
ought to be the guardians of our liberties.”267 
 Under current takings doctrine, state courts certainly offer more 
hope for property owners challenging takings than do federal courts. 
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Although the state rules are not completely cast in terms favorable to 
property owners, the growing recognition by state courts of their power 
to reject federal doctrine, and to grant more exacting review of legisla-
tive decisions to take, offers hope for greater scrutiny of legislative ac-
tions and greater protection of property rights in the future. It is a nas-
cent trend, to be sure, but nonetheless a promising one for property 
owners. 
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